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Savings, subgoals, and reference points
Helen Colby∗ Gretchen B. Chapman†
Abstract
Decision makers often save money for a specific goal by forgoing d scretionary consumption and instead putting the
money toward the savings goal. We hypothesized that referenc points can be exploited to enhance this type of saving.
In two hypothetical scenario studies, subjects made judgments of their likelihood to forgo a small expenditure in order
to put the money toward the savings goal. In Experiment 1, judgments were higher if the savings goal was presented
as composed of weekly subgoals (e.g., save $60 per week to buya $180 iPod). Experiment 2 replicated this finding
and demonstrated that the subgoal manipulation increased judgments of likelihood to save money only when the money
saved from the foregone consumption would allow the decision maker to meet the weekly subgoal exactly (not under
or overshoot it). These results suggest a reference point mechanism and point to ways that behavioral decision research
can be harnessed to improve economic behaviors.
Keywords: financial decision making, savings behavior, subgoals, goal setting.
1 Introduction
Decision makers frequently make judgments about what
will help them engage in regular self regulatory behav-
iors such as saving money, exercising, or studying for
an exam. These judgments are important because they
may guide associated behavior such as opening a particu-
lar type of savings account, wearing a pedometer, or set-
ting a schedule for studying. The current paper focuses
on judgments about saving money toward a specific goal.
Whereas some savings goals require a one-time action,
such as enrolling in a retirement savings plan with au-
tomatic paycheck deductions, other savings goals require
frequent actions over a relatively short period of time. For
example, saving for a new refrigerator or a used car often
entails regularly putting away money that would other-
wise be spent on other things. A consumer might, for
instance, decide to forgo her daily latte or weekly dinner
out on a consistent basis in order to put that money to-
ward a short-term savings goal. What factors do decision
makers predict will affect their willingness to forgo po-
tential immediate consumption utility in favor of saving
the available money for the later, larger desired purchase?
Short-term savings can entail a specific goal, such as
saving enough to buy a car by the time one graduates
from college, or saving enough for a vacation before the
planned vacation date arrives. Setting goals has long been
recognized as a way to motivate behavior (Mento, Steel &
Karren 1987; Rawsthorne & Elliot, 1999; Harackiewicz
∗Psychology Department and Department of Supply Chain Manage-
ment and Marketing Sciences, Rutgers University, 152 Frelinghuysen
Road, Piscataway NJ 08854-8020. Email: hcolby@rci.rutgers.edu.
†Department of Psychology, Rutgers University.
et al., 2002). Setting a savings goal has been found to
positively affect savings behavior (Fry et al. 2008). How-
ever, setting savings goals may not always have the de-
sired motivating effect. Saving towards multiple savings
goals at once has been shown to be less effective at moti-
vating savings than saving towards a single savings goal
(Soman & Zhao, 2011). Motivating savings can be dif-
ficult, as the long-term savings goal is typically much
larger than the small steps that can be taken to reach it
(Bandura & Schunk, 1981). A goal of saving $3,000 to
buy a used car can seem frustratingly far away when sav-
ing $5 at a time. Buying today’s latte would not really set
one far behind on the goal. This problem may be solved,
however, by setting more obtainable subgoals. Setting
and achieving subgoals has been shown to increase per-
ceived self-efficacy, interest in a task, and task persis-
tence (Stock & Cervone 1990; Bandura & Schunk 1981).
In some cases consumers seem to be strongly motivated
by the ability to achieve partial success through smaller
goals, such as paying off individual debt accounts (Amar
et al. 2011), although it has also recently been demon-
strated that achieving subgoals can decrease motivation
and performance in some circumstances (Amir & Ariely
2008).
Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) demonstrated the ben-
eficial effect of subgoals in the context of proofreading
essays. Subjects were randomized to receive only the fi-
nal goal (proofread three essays in three weeks), to re-
ceive subgoals (proofread one essay every week), or to
schedule their own binding deadlines (select due dates
for each of the three essays). Accuracy and timeliness
of performance were higher for the subgoal group than
for the final goal group, indicating that subgoals facilitate
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goal achievement. Furthermore, those in the self-imposed
deadline group usually set subgoals for themselves, set-
ting the due dates prior to the final deadline. This pro-
vides evidence that individuals can accurately predict that
subgoals will help them achieve long-term goals. In an-
other study, subjects in an executive education class were
given the opportunity to choose deadlines for turning in
three short papers over the course of the semester. Nearly
three-quarters of the students chose to impose subgoals
on themselves, making at least one of the papers due be-
fore the final deadline. Thus, not only can subgoals help
improve performance, but lay people are aware of this
and use subgoals to help improve self-regulation.
In the current paper we explore subgoals as a method
for enhancing the motivating effects of savings goals and
investigate the mechanism behind it. Specifically, setting
smaller savings subgoals may be a way to increase will-
ingness to forgo small immediate consumption opportu-
nities in favor of saving towards a larger goal. For exam-
ple, rather than setting a goal to save $3,000 for a used
car, one might have the goal of saving $60 per week for
a year. With this subgoal, the $25 saved by forgoing lat-
tes every day this week may seem like a more significant
contribution to the savings goal.
If subgoals have a motivating effect, it may be because
they serve as a reference point. Prospect Theory has at
its core the concept of the reference point, against which
possible outcomes are assessed (Kahneman & Tversky
1979). In most cases the status quo serves as the de facto
reference point, but this need not always be true. Heath,
Larrick and Wu (1999) suggest that goals can act as refer-
ence points, with failure to attain the goal experienced as
incurring a loss on the value function. Van Osch, van den
Hout and Stiggelbout (2006) further support this concept
with experimental evidence that people use life goals as
reference points when evaluating length-of-life gambles.
We similarly propose that decision makers who have set
a goal but not yet achieved it view their status in the loss
domain, with goal-achievement as the reference point.
According to Prospect Theory, decision makers are more
sensitive to changes near the reference point than those
far from the reference point. Thus, a subgoal acting as a
reference point could make a decision maker sensitive to
changes in amount of money saved even if those amounts
were far from the final goal.
The current research examines the effect of subgoal
setting on judgments about savings behavior in hypothet-
ical scenarios. In two experiments we look at the effect of
weekly subgoals on judgments about willingness to forgo
short-term consumption in favor of saving for a larger
later purchase. We hypothesize that subgoals will change
the reference point against which outcomes are evaluated,
resulting in changed judgments of willingness to save.
2 Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine whether
the presence of a subgoal had an effect on predicted will-
ingness to save. Willingness to save was operationalized
by asking subjects how likely they would be to forgo a
planned dinner out with friends. Scenarios asked subjects
to imagine that they were planning to spend $20 on din-
ner but were considering saving the money instead. Be-
cause we suspected that asking subjects a simple yes/no
question about saving would be subject to a high level of
experimenter demand, we provided subjects with an 11-
point scale and asked them how likely they were to skip
the dinner and save the money.
Our hypothesis was that, because the presence of the
subgoal will set the reference point to a smaller dollar
amount, saving $20 will seem more appealing in the sub-
goal than in the no subgoal condition.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Subjects
Three hundred and sixty-nine Rutgers University under-
graduates participated for credit towards a research par-
ticipation requirement for an introductory level psychol-
ogy class.
2.1.2 Design
This study used a 2(subgoal experimental manipulation)
x 2(counter-balance condition) mixed design. Each sub-
ject read four scenarios, two of which described a sub-
goal. The experimental manipulation was the presence
or absence of a savings subgoal, presented as a specific
weekly savings goal, with an amount between $35 and
$60. Subjects were asked to imagine that they had been
planning to go out to dinner and expected to spend about
$20, and that they were also saving for a future purchase.
Each subject saw four separate scenarios with saved-for
items of an iPod, Wii, shoes, or a cruise. Saved-for items
ranged in cost from $100 to $500. Each scenario spec-
ified an amount already saved during the week for that
item, such that in the subgoal versions the addition of the
$20 would allow the weekly subgoal to be met exactly.
For example, in the iPod scenario, all subjects were told
that the iPod would cost $180 and that they had saved $40
so far this week. Subjects in the subgoal condition were
also told that they had a goal to save $60 per week, such
that the additional $20 from forgoing dinner would allow
them to meet their weekly goal.
Subjects were asked to rate their likelihood to forgo
the dinner in favor of saving the money for the item. Re-
ponses were expressed on a scale that ranged from 0%
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Figure 1: Mean subject rating of likelihood of forgoing
the dinner out with or without a subgoal for each of the
four savings scenarios in Experiment 1. Error bars repre-
sent standard error of the mean.


























(definitely will not) to 100% (definitely will) in inter-
vals of 10%. Subjects were given four total questions,
two with a subgoal present and two absent a subgoal.
There were 2 between-subjects counterbalanced condi-
tions (iPod and Wii with subgoal, cruise and shoes with-
out subgoal, and vice versa), such that across all sub-
jects, each scenario appeared in both the subgoal and no-
subgoal conditions.
2.1.3 Materials
Subjects completed this study on their own computers via
the internet. Instructions were provided, then questions
were displayed one at a time. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of the two counterbalance conditions
described above. Each version included two subgoal-
present and two subgoal-absent scenarios. Question or-
der was randomized for each subject. The four questions
of interest in this study were presented with 16 additional
filler questions (see Appendix).
2.2 Results
As shown in Figure 1, subjects reported a higher like-
lihood of forgoing dinner in the presence of a subgoal
across all four of the savings scenarios. We conducted
a 2(subgoal vs. no subgoal) × 4(scenario) mixed model
ANOVA with judged likelihood to forgo dinner as the de-
pendent measure. Both factors were within-subject vari-
ables, but because of the mixed design, their interaction
was between subjects (and corresponds to the counterbal-
ance condition). There was a main effect of subgoal con-
dition, F(1,368)=48.47,p<0.0001 and a main effect of
scenario,F(3,1100)=18.07,p<0.0001 but no interaction
(F<1). Follow-up two-tailedt tests showed a significant
subgoal effect for each of the four scenarios,t(367), all
ts>2.5, allps<.012.
Because Experiment 1 used a within-subjects manip-
ulation, one might be concerned that the subgoal effect
is only manifest when subjects can compare the sub-
goal and no subgoal conditions. To address this con-
cern, we repeated the mixed model ANOVA described
above, adding a 4-level order variable indicating which
of the four scenarios the subject saw first. The effect
of subgoal, F(1,365)=39.22, p<0.0001, was not mod-
erated by the order variable,F(3,365)=0.33,p=.803.
We repeated the mixed model ANOVA once more, this
time including a between-subjects variable that indicated
whether the first scenario the subject saw was in the sub-
goal or no subgoal condition. This order variable inter-
acted with the within-subject subgoal condition variable,
F(1,367)=13.30,p=0.0003, indicating that overall sub-
jects gave higher ratings in the subgoal condition than
in the no subgoal condition, but that this difference was
larger when the first scenario seen was in the no sub-
goal condition (n=212, means [sd]: 60.07 [30.62] vs.
43.56 [30.05]) than when it was in the subgoal condi-
tion (n=157, means [sd]: 56.08 [32.48] vs. 51.53 [32.12]).
Contrasts indicated that the difference was significant in
the former case,F(1, 367)=58.85,p<0.0001 and marginal
in the latter case,F(1, 367)=3.23,p=0.07.
We also performed a between-subjects 2 (subgoal con-
dition) × 4 (scenario) ANOVA using only the first sce-
nario each subject saw. There remained a significant ef-
fect of subgoal,F(1, 361)=12.75,p=0.0004. Similarly,
the effect of subgoal remained if the analysis included the
first one or two scenarios in the same condition for each
subject,F(1,367)=20.14,p<0.0001. (That is, the first two
scenarios if both or neither had subgoals; otherwise the
just the first scenario.) Thus, the subgoal effect does not
appear to be an artifact of the within-subject manipula-
tion.
2.3 Discussion
Consistent with our hypotheses, subjects judged that it
was more likely they would forgo the planned dinner in
favor of saving for a future purchase when a subgoal was
present than when it was not. This finding suggests that,
in the absence of a subgoal, the reference point is the total
savings goal, but when a subgoal is present, the reference
point is the subgoal. Figure 2 shows the Prospect Theory
value function in which subjective value is an S-shaped
function of money saved and outcomes are evaluated as
gains or losses relative to the reference point.
Once the reference point is set, the prospect of saving
$20 would then be evaluated against this reference point.
Because the reference point is a savings goal that has not
yet been reached, the relevant area of the value function
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Figure 2: (a)The Prospect Theory curve without a subgoal and(b) with a subgoal.
In the absence of a subgoal, the reference point is the total
amount needed to purchase the item. The $20 savings is
evaluated on the flatest part of the curve.
In the presence of a subgoal, the reference point is the
amount of the weekly subgoal. The $20 would allow the
achievement of the goal, so it is evaluated on the steepest





curve is the loss domain. In this case, because saving
money is reducing the amount that still needs to be saved,
the individual can be seen as moving up the negative part
of the curve.
The evaluation of how much utility would be gained
from the additional savings of $20 should drive the judg-
ment of how likely one would be to forgo the dinner to
save the money. If the utility of saving the $20 is large it
would overwhelm the utility projected to accrue from the
dinner, making skipping the dinner more appealing. If the
utility gained from saving the additional $20 is small, the
projected utility from the dinner with friends would over-
whelm it, making the dinner the more appealing option.
When only the large dollar amount of the total savings
goal is present, the $20 would be evaluated as a small part
of the total amount. Because the amount that had already
been saved was small in each case, the area of the loss
curve on which the $20 is evaluated is nearly flat, with
each additional dollar saved providing little marginal uti-
ity. By contrast, when the reference point was the smaller
dollar value of the weekly subgoal, the amount already
saved is a much larger portion, and the area of the loss
curve on which the $20 is evaluated is much steeper. Be-
cause the additional $20 savings would allow the subject
to meet the subgoal, the relevant area of the curve is that
touching the origin: the steepest part of the curve, provid-
ing the highest level of marginal utility. (See Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) for a visual representation of this point).
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the presence of a subgoal
increases reported willingness to save money by forgoing
consumption. We propose that the mechanism underly-
ing this effect is based on shifting reference points on
the Prospect Theory value function. However, alterna-
tive explanations are possible, including the fact that the
description of the subgoal may communicate a demand
effect to save or provide information on the appropriate
rate of savings, the decision maker’s commitment to mak-
ing the purchase, or the decision maker’s funds available
to meet the savings goal. Consequently, the purpose of
Experiment 2 was to provide a more specific test of the
reference point account of the subgoal effect.
In Experiment 1, in the subgoal condition the money
available to be saved ($20) was always exactly enough
to reach the weekly subgoal. In Experiment 2, we tested
whether the mere presence of a subgoal is enough to en-
courage saving behavior, or if instead it is the impact of
actually achieving the subgoal that has the effect. Based
on Prospect Theory, our hypothesis was that the presence
of a subgoal would increase subjects’ ratings of their like-
lihood to forgo the dinner out primarily when the addi-
tional savings would allow the decision maker to meet the
subgoal exactly. We predicted that savings achieved from
a foregone dinner that undershot or overshot the weekly
subgoal would not be as motivating. The shift in refer-
ence point caused by the presence of a subgoal causes
the $20 to be evaluated on a steep portion of the value
function, and the steepest portion is achieved at the refer-
ence point. That is, in the conditions where $20 meets the
weekly subgoal, the evaluation occurs on the steepest part
of the loss curve, leading to the greatest perceived benefit
from saving. Alternative mechanisms for the subgoal ef-
fect would not necessarily predict it to be critical whether
the $20 met the subgoal exactly or over- or under-shot it.
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3.1 Method
3.1.1 Subjects
One hundred and seven individuals at the Rutgers Uni-
versity student center participated in this experiment in
exchange for a small candy bar.
3.1.2 Design
The experiment used a 2 (subgoal: present vs. absent)
x 3 (total savings: low, medium, or high) within-subject
design. Each subject read six versions of a single sce-
nario (the iPod scenario from Experiment 1). Thus, each
subject saw each of the six experimental conditions. As
in Experiment 1, subjects were asked to imagine that they
had been planning to spend money on dinner out and were
also saving for an iPod costing $180. Half of the scenario
versions presented a subgoal as a savings goal of $60 per
week. Different versions of the scenario described the
amount the decision maker had already saved during the
current week as $25 (low), $40 (medium), or $55 (high).
When a subgoal was present, forgoing the dinner and sav-
ing the $20 would therefore result in weekly savings of ei-
ther $15 under the weekly savings goal (low condition—
i.e., $25 already saved + $20 additional saving = $45,
which is $15 shy of the $60 goal), the exact amount of
the weekly savings goal (medium condition), or $15 over
the weekly savings goal (high condition). When the sub-
goal was absent, the same amounts of previous savings
were used ($25, $40, and $55), but saving the $20 in ad-
dition to the amount already saved would result in a sum
well below the total goal of $180. Subjects were asked to
rate on a scale of 0% (definitely will not) to 100% (defi-
nitely will) in intervals of 10% how likely they would be
to forgo the planned spending and instead save the money
for the iPod.
3.1.3 Materials
Each subject was given a one-page, two-sided paper-
and-pencil questionnaire with six scenarios. A balanced
Latin-square design with six between-subjects versions
was used to vary the order of the six scenarios across sub-
jects.
3.2 Results
A 2 (subgoal) × 3 (total savings) × 6 (counterbalance
condition) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first
two factors revealed the expected main effect of subgoal
F(1,101)=15.59,p<0.001 (Figure 3). Subjects gave sig-
nificantly higher judgments of likelihood to forgo din-
ner in the presence of a subgoal (M=46.93, SD=32.08)
than in its absence (M=40.21, SD=28.83). There was a
Figure 3: Average subject rating of likelihood of forgoing
the dinner in experiment 2 with low ($25), medium ($40),
or high ($55) previous savings. Error bars represent stan-


























main effect of total savings,F(2, 202)= 8.59,p<0.001,
qualified by an interaction between presence of a subgoal
and total savings,F(2, 202) = 6.08,p=0.003. Planned
contrasts indicated a significant quadratic form to the in-
teraction,F(1,101)=10.36,p=0.002, indicating that rated
likelihood to save was higher when the $20 allowed
the decision maker to reach the subgoal exactly than
when the savings would under- or over-shoot the sub-
goal. However, this quadratic effect was not present in
the no subgoal condition where equivalent dollar val-
ues were used. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the
mean rating when the subgoal was present and could be
met exactly (subgoal/medium) were significantly higher
in both the subgoal/high condition where the $20 saved
overshoots the subgoal (t(106)=4.46,p<.001) and sub-
goal/low condition where the $20 saved undershoots the
subgoal (t(106)=2.52,p=0.013).1
3.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 revealed the expected main effect of sub-
goal and the interaction between amount already saved
and presence of subgoal, indicating the importance of ex-
actness of reaching the subgoal. We propose that the pres-
ence of the subgoal shifted the reference point from the
total amount necessary to be saved to the smaller amount
of the weekly subgoal. This caused the $20 available to
be saved to be evaluated on a much steeper part of the
loss curve. When the $20 savings was evaluated against
the reference point of the total goal, the part of the curve
on which it was evaluated was so flat that a difference of
$15 more or less caused by the different amounts already
saved had only a small effect on utility (see Figure (4a)).
1Thirteen individuals answered “yes” to a question indicating that
they had already completed a previous pilot version of the qustion-
naire. When the analyses were repeated with these subjects removed,
the findings did not change and all results reported as significa t above
remained significant.
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Figure 4: (a) The prospect theory curve without a subgoal and(b) with a subgoal.
When the reference point is the total goal the difference in
amount already saved does not make a significant differ-
ence in how attractive saving the additional money would
be.
When the reference point is the weekly subgoal the dif-
ference in amount already saved significantly changes
the utility from saving additional money. The additional
money saved past the subgoal is evaluated on the positive











With a reference point of the smaller weekly subgoal,
however, the amount already saved had more of an im-
pact. In the “low” condition (where the decision maker
had saved $25 in the previous week), having only saved
a small amount towards the subgoal meant that the $20
was evaluated on a lower, flatter area of the curve, mak-
ing the $20 savings relatively less attractive compared
to the medium saved amount/subgoal condition. In the
“medium” condition, meeting the subgoal exactly pro-
vided the maximum amount of utility given the available
$20, because in this case it was evaluated on the steepest
area of the curve, the area bordering the origin (Figure
4b).
In the “high” condition, the $20 saved would cause de-
cision makers to over-shoot the subgoal, because only $5
of the $20 was necessary to meet the subgoal. Here, sub-
jects trended toward being less likely than in either of the
other subgoal conditions to forgo the dinner. In this con-
dition only $5 of the $20 would be evaluated in the loss
portion of the curve with the reference point of the sub-
goal. The other $15 would be evaluated on the positive
portion of the curve. Because, due to loss aversion, the
gain portion of the value function is less steep than the
loss portion, the utility of this $15 overshoot would be
relatively less appealing (Figure 4b).
4 General discussion
The current experiments provided evidence for the im-
portance of subgoals in judgments about saving for short-
term purchases of durable and quasi-durable goods. De-
cisions about forgoing immediate consumption utility in
favor of saving for a future purchase are made more
frequently than many other decisions regarding saving.
There is, however, only a small literature on such deci-
sions compared to the relatively more robust area of re-
tirement savings (e.g. Benzarti & Thaler, 2007; Wiener &
Doescher, 2008). The current experiments provide some
empirical evidence for theoretically motivated ways to
encourage savings behavior through subgoal setting.
Helping individuals improve short-term savings is an
issue of significant practical importance. Consumers can
increase their overall utility by avoiding making durable
goods purchases such as washing machines, cars, and
furniture on credit, thereby allowing money that would
be spent on interest payments to instead be used for in-
creased consumption. One way to avoid use of credit
is to save up money in advance. Simple reference point
manipulations, unlike savings match and educational pro-
grams, have the benefit of being free, easy to apply, and
requiring few resources to help implement in a popula-
tion. By manipulating the reference point in the form of
subgoal setting, the slope of the prospect theory curve
can be used to help individuals achieve their own savings
goals and increase overall consumption utility. Previous
theoretical work (Koszegi, 2009) has applied reference
points to savings behavior, but previous studies have not
examined a reference point account of the role of sub-
goals in saving behavior.
The current experiments involved subgoals that were
large enough to be a significant portion of the total goal,
but small enough that the addition of $20 was a large con-
tribution towards the weekly goal. Experiment 2 showed
that the act of saving just enough to meet the subgoal was
judged to be particularly appealing and likely to lead to
the desired saving result. The boundaries of this phe-
nomenon for helping individuals were not explored in
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the current experiments but would be of both theoreti-
cal and practical importance. An interesting direction for
future research would be to determine the characteristics
of subgoals that are small enough to allow the frequent
benefit of meeting them but large enough so as not to
seem insignificant. Subgoals that are too small, relative
to the overall goal, could have the opposite effect, as in
the “pennies-a-day” phenomenon where a large expendi-
ture seems small if divided into many portions (Gourville,
1998).
The current experiments examined judgments of will-
ingness to save money, not actual savings behavior. Hy-
pothetical judgments of normative behavior such as sav-
ing likely overstate decision makers’ actual propensity
to engage in the behavior. For example, Choi, Laib-
son, Madrian, and Metrick (2006) report that, among em-
ployees attending a financial education seminar, 28% of
those already participating in a 401(k) plan said that they
planned to increase their contribution rate, but only 8%
actually did so. All of those not yet participating in a
401(k) plan said that they planned to enroll, but only 14%
actually did so in the following 6 months. Thus, the judg-
ments made by subjects in the current studies may not
reflect their actual proclivity to save money in real sit-
uations. Importantly, however, in the present paper, the
focus is not on the level of savings but rather on how
the level of savings is affected by subgoal manipulations.
Thus, the result of importance here is that reported likeli-
hood to save money is higher when there is a subgoal and
when the immediate consumption to be foregone will al-
low one to meet the subgoal exactly. Although actual sav-
ings behavior may indeed be lower than the judgments
given by our subjects, the pattern of findings (more sav-
ing with subgoals) is likely to replicate with real behav-
ior. The Ariely and Werbenbrocht (2002) study described
earlier suggests that decision makers have some accuracy
in predicting how subgoals will affect their behavior.
Decision makers’ judgments about what they would do
reveal their lay theories about their own behavior. The
subjects in our studies predicted that they would be more
likely to save money if they had a subgoal. Our studies
suggest that subgoals increase judgments of proclivity to
save money because the subgoals act as reference points
and the perception of amount saved below or above the
goal follows the Prospect Theory value function. Thus,
people’s judgments about their own willingness to save
are guided by a Prospect Theory value function. In other
words, people use Prospect Theory as an implicit theory
guiding predictions about their own behavior.
Recent research has demonstrated that savings behav-
ior is contextually driven (Mulainathan & Shafir, 2009)
and can be augmented by fairly simple manipulations
such as how money is placed in envelopes (Soman &
Cheema, 2008; 2011; Soman & Zhao, 2011) or altering
the retirement plan default (Choi, Laibson, Madrian &
Metrick, 2003). The current results suggest that setting
subgoals may also augment savings behavior. Indeed,
many goal-directed behaviors besides saving money for
a future purchase entail cumulative progress towards an
ventual goal. Examples include weight loss, finishing
a dissertation, or reducing our national carbon footprint.
The current studies suggest that the reference point prin-
ciple of Prospect Theory can be harnessed to facilitate
goal progress in many domains by setting smaller re-
peated subgoals.
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Appendix
All questions, including filler questions, seen by subjects
in Experiment 1. Subjects got one of either version A
or B for each question. Question order was completely
randomized.
1A - You have been saving for a $300 beach house
rental for a Florida vacation. How likely is it that you
will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put
the money towards the beach house rental?
1B - You have been saving for a $300 Florida vacation.
How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your
friends, and instead put the money towards the vacation?
2A - You have been saving for a $100 textbook for next
semester. How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner
with your friends, and instead put the money towards the
textbook?
2B - You have been saving for $100 for school ex-
penses for next semester. How likely is it that you will
forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put the
money towards the school expenses?
3A - You have been saving for $80 for a roadtrip. How
likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends,
and instead put the money towards the roadtrip?
3C - You have been saving for $80 of gas for a roadtrip.
How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your
friends, and instead put the money towards the gas?
4A - You have been saving for $150 in camping gear.
How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your
friends, and instead put the money towards the camping
gear?
4B - You have been saving for a $150 camping tent.
How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your
friends, and instead put the money towards the tent?
5A - You have been saving for a 19 inch, $300 flat
screen TV. The flat screen is black with an oval-shaped
base. The TV has 1440 by 900 pixel resolution and comes
with a power cord, wall mounting unit, owner’s manual,
and remote control. How likely is it that you will forgo
the dinner with your friends, and instead put the money
towards the TV?
5B - You have been saving for a 19 inch, $300 flat
screen TV. How likely is it that you will forgo the din-
ner with your friends, and instead put the money towards
the TV?
6A - You have been saving for a $130 desk. The desk
is a light wood color. It has two drawers on the left side
and a small drawer in the center. How likely is it that you
will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put
the money towards the desk?
6B - You have been saving for a $130 desk. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the desk?
7A - You have been saving for a two piece, $120 lug-
gage set. How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner
with your friends, and instead put the money towards the
luggage?
7B - You have been saving for a two piece, $120 lug-
gage set. The luggage is black with thick handles, silver
zippers, and black wheels. Each piece includes two front
pouches and a black luggage tag. How likely is it that
you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead
put the money towards the luggage?
8A - You have been saving for an $80 sleeping bag.
How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your
friends, and instead put the money towards the sleeping
bag?
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8B - You have been saving for an $80 sleeping bag.
The sleeping bag is green with a full length zipper. It has
an interior cotton liner and a drawstring top. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the sleeping bag?
9A - You have been saving for the $150 bike shown
in the picture below. How likely is it that you will forgo
the dinner with your friends, and instead put the money
towards the bike?
9B - You have been saving for a $150 bike similar to
the one shown in the picture below. How likely is it that
you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead
put the money towards the bike?
10A - You have been saving for the $190 stereo system
shown in the picture below. How likely is it that you will
forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put the
money towards the stereo?
10B - You have been saving for a $190 stereo system
similar to the one shown in the picture below. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the stereo?
11A - You have been saving for a $90 futon similar to
the one shown in the picture below. How likely is it that
you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead
put the money towards the futon?
11B - You have been saving for the $90 futon shown
in the picture below. How likely is it that you will forgo
the dinner with your friends, and instead put the money
towards the futon?
A12 - You have been saving for a $70 tennis racket
similar to the one shown in the picture below. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the tennis racket?
12B - You have been saving for the $70 tennis racket
shown in the picture below. How likely is it that you will
forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put the
money towards the tennis racket?
13A - You have been saving for a $180 iPod. You
have already saved $40 towards the iPod this week. Your
weekly savings goal is $60, so this extra $20 would allow
you to meet your goal. How likely is it that you will forgo
the dinner with your friends, and instead put the money
towards the iPod?
13B - You have been saving for a $180 iPod. You have
already saved $40 towards the iPod this week. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the iPod?
14A - You have been saving for a $250 Wii. You
have already saved $30 towards the Wii this week. Your
weekly savings goal is $50, so this extra $20 would allow
you to meet your goal. How likely is it that you will forgo
the dinner with your friends, and instead put the money
towards the Wii?
14B - You have been saving for a $250 Wii. You have
already saved $30 towards the Wii this week. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the Wii?
15A - You have been saving for a $500 cruise for spring
break. You have already saved $30 towards the cruise
this week. How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner
with your friends, and instead put the money towards the
cruise?
15B - You have been saving for a $500 cruise for spring
break. You have already saved $30 towards the cruise this
week. Your weekly savings goal is $50, so this extra $20
would allow you to meet your goal. How likely is it that
you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead
put the money towards the cruise?
16A - You have been saving for a $100 pair of shoes.
You have already saved $15 towards the shoes this week.
How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your
friends, and instead put the money towards the shoes?
16B - You have been saving for a $100 pair of shoes.
You have already saved $15 towards the shoes this week.
Your weekly savings goal is $35, so this extra $20 would
allow you to meet your goal. How likely is it that you
will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put
the money towards the shoes?
17A - You have been saving to buy $100 tickets to a
music festival you have been looking forward to. How
likely is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends,
and instead put the money towards the tickets?
17B - You have been saving to buy $100 tickets to a
music festival that you have promised to go to with your
brother. How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner
with your friends, and instead put the money towards the
tickets?
18A - You have been saving to buy an $80 microwave
for yourself. How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner
with your friends, and instead put the money towards the
microwave?
18B - You have been saving to buy an $80 microwave
as a wedding present for your cousin. How likely is it that
you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead
put the money towards the microwave?
19A - You have been saving to buy $90 worth of party
supplies for your roommate’s birthday party. How likely
is it that you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and
instead put the money towards the party supplies?
19B - You have been saving to buy $90 worth of party
supplies for your birthday party. How likely is it that you
will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead put
the money towards the party supplies?
20A - You have been saving to buy a $60 DVD player
as a birthday present for your sister. How likely is it that
you will forgo the dinner with your friends, and instead
put the money towards the DVD player?
20B - You have been saving to buy a $60 DVD player
for yourself. How likely is it that you will forgo the dinner
with your friends, and instead put the money towards the
DVD player?
